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ABSTRACT




As an indispensable part of mobile communication systems, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) can be leveraged to complement terrestrial networks by providing
coverage to areas where infrastructures are scarce. Equipped with self-navigation
and strong automation, UAVs have extensive applications to environmental mon-
itoring, disaster recovery, search and rescue, owing to their excellent agility and
autonomy. As a result, an increasing demand arises for ubiquitous connectivity
and reliable communication for data exchange between UAVs, and between UAVs
and ground stations. Since UAVs operate in three-dimensional (3D) space with
strong manoeuvrability, random trajectories and wireless propagation environment
can pose significant challenges to the study on coverage and capacity of UAV net-
works. On the other hand, UAVs are increasingly posing threats to information
security. UAVs can be potentially used to eavesdrop and jam wireless transmissions
between legitimate terrestrial transceivers. It is of practical interest to understand
the robustness of terrestrial wireless communications under exposure to new threats
from aerial adversaries. This thesis studies the coverage and capacity, including
secure coverage and secrecy capacity, of UAV-enabled wireless networks with UAVs
flying under 3D random trajectories based on stochastic geometry and measure con-
vergence theory. The detailed contributions of this thesis are summarised as:
• Capacity analysis of UAV networks under random trajectories. We geomet-
rically derive probability distributions of UAV-to-UAV distances and closed-
form bounds for the capacity can be obtained by exploiting the Jensen’s in-
equality. We extrapolate the idea to dense UAV networks and analyse the
impact of network densification and imperfect channel state information on
the capacity.
• Connectivity analysis of uncoordinated UAV swarms. New closed-form bounds
are derived for the outage probability of individual UAVs, and broadcast con-
nectivity of each UAV which evaluates the reliability of broadcast across the
swarm. The qualifying conditions of the bounds on 3D coverage and impact
of ground interference on the outage are identified.
• Secure connectivity analysis in UAV networks. We propose a trust model
based on UAVs‘ behaviour and mobility pattern and characteristics of inter-
UAV channels. We derive analytical expressions of both physical and secure
connectivity probabilities with/without considering Doppler shift.
• Secrecy capacity analysis against aerial eavesdroppers. We analyse ergodic
and ε-outage secrecy capacities of ground link in the presence of cooperative
aerial eavesdroppers. The “cut-off” density of eavesdroppers under which the
secrecy capacities vanish is identified. By decoupling the analysis of random
trajectories from random channel fading, closed-form approximations with al-
most sure convergence to the secrecy capacities are devised.
Dissertation directed by Professor Ren Ping Liu, Associate Professor Andrew Zhang,
and Dr. Wei Ni
School of Electrical and Data Engineering
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